Introduction
Popular Internet services frequently rely on clusters of commodity computers as their computing platform [7] . The performance and scalability of cluster-based servers have been studied extensively [1, 7, 9] . However, understanding designs for availability, behavior during component failures, and the relationship between performance and availability (and combined performability) of these servers has received much less attention.
In this paper, we seek to understand the impact of different communication architectures on the performability of clusterbased servers in the presence of communication-related faults. In particular, our goal is to assess server performability when using two common communication subtrates: the kernel-based Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the user-level Virtual Interface Architecture (VIA) [18] . These substrates have been studied extensively in terms of their achievable performance [10, 14] , but their availability has not been addressed.
We seek to understand how the interplay between the application, operating system, and communication stack affects availability. This approach stands in contrast to the rich body of existing work that examines faults arising from noise and packet loss. This line of research has produced results ranging from fundamental limits on encoding in the presence of noise [32] to sophisticated time-out and retry algorithms [6, 19] . However, all the studies fail to address the effect of channel faults on entities outside of the communication systems, e.g., the operating system and applications.
Along the same lines, little is understood about the effect of communication-related resource exhaustion and application faults on server performance and availability. An example of such faults is when the operating system denies memory for the communication layer to use as buffer space, as is possible in TCP. From the perspective of the communication stack, this failure originates from the top of the stack rather than the bottom, as in the case of the channel faults. Understanding the overall system reaction to these non-channel faults is also critical to increasing the availability of next-generation systems. Returning to our example, a communication substrate robust to memory allocation faults allows the service designer to have a memory-stressed node send load-shedding messages. On the other hand, if the communication breaks down because of memory allocation faults, the faulty node must be able to relieve the memory pressure without communicating.
Based on these observations, in this paper we examine the impact of communication hardware, resource exhaustion, and application faults on the availability, performance, and performability of PRESS, a cluster-based locality-conscious Web server [9] . The study relies on our own fault-injection and analysis methodology [26] to examine the differences between TCP and VIA, according to their implementations over the Giganet cLAN network.
Our study illustrates several performance vs. robustness tradeoffs. We show that TCP, in spite of its sophisticated time out and retry, does not provide greater availability than a user-level communication protocol such as VIA in the context of cluster-based services. TCP has two features that limit its applicability in this context: it assumes that packet drops are a sign of transient problems, and it uses a byte-stream abstraction in messaging. The former makes TCP fault detection too slow to be useful, whereas the latter makes the server vulnerable to bad parameters, because a bad offset or pointer corrupts the entire byte stream after the fault.
We also found that pre-allocation of resources, in particular for memory, can affect the robustness of cluster-based servers. Preallocation of buffers and VIA descriptors is essential to maintaining communication during resource stress periods. For VIA, this suggests that dynamic pinning and un-pinning of memory regions exposes servers to resource exhaustion faults.
The benefits of using a user-level communication system such as VIA over TCP ultimately depend on the real fault load. If the designers of a cluster-based server believe that the fault load re-mains the same regardless of which communication substrate is used, then clearly user-level communication systems provide better performance and higher availability. On the other hand, if their instincts are that a user-level communication substrate might be subjected to a more stressful fault load, because the technology is less mature and the programming model more complex, then a TCP-based implementation may be more desirable. By studying a range of fault loads, we determine the circumstances under which one protocol is preferable over the other.
Given our experience with TCP and VIA substrates, we suggest directions for the design of future communication layers. For example, we believe that a high-performance, robust communication layer should be message-based, single-copy, and pre-allocate all resources.
Methodology
We will use the two-phase methodology proposed in [26] to evaluate the performability of PRESS in the presence of faults. In the first phase, the evaluator defines the set of all possible faults, then injects them (and the subsequent recovery) one at a time into a running system. During the fault and recovery periods, the evaluator must quantify performance and availability as a function of time. We currently equate performance with throughput, the number of requests successfully served per second, and define availability as the percentage of requests served successfully. In the second phase, the evaluator uses an analytical model to compute the expected average throughput and availability, combining the server's behavior under normal operation, the behavior during component faults, and the rates of fault and repair of each component.
Phase 1: Measuring Performance Under Single-Fault Fault Loads
There are two tricky issues when injecting faults. First, when measuring the server's performance in the presence of a particular fault, the fault must last long enough to allow all stages in the model of phase 2 to be observed and measured. The one exception to this guideline is that a server may not exhibit all model stages under certain faults. In these cases, the evaluator must use his understanding of the server to correctly determine which stages are missing (and later setting the time of the stage in the abstract model to 0). Second, a benchmark must be chosen to drive the server such that the delivered throughput is relatively stable throughout the observation period (except for transient warm up effects). This is necessary to decouple measured performance from the injection time of a fault.
Phase 2: Modeling Server's Performability Under Expected Fault Loads
Our model for describing average performance and availability is built in two parts. The first part of the model describes the system's response to a single fault in a 7-stage model. The second part of the model combines the effects of each fault, as described in the first part, along with the MTTR and MTTF of each component to arrive at an overall average availability and performance.
Per-Fault Seven-Stage Model. Figure 1 illustrates our 7-stage model of service performance in the presence of a fault. Time is shown on the X-axis and throughput is shown on the Y-axis. Stage A models the degraded throughput delivered by the system from the occurrence of the fault to when the system detects the fault. Stage B models the transient throughput delivered as the system reconfigures to account for the fault; the system may take some time to reach a stable performance regime because of warming effects. We model the throughput during this transient period as the average throughput for the period. After the system stabilizes, throughput will likely remain at a degraded level because the faulty component has not yet recovered, been repaired or replaced. Stage C models this degraded performance regime. Stage D models the transient performance after the component recovers. Stage E models the stable performance regime achieved by the service after the component has recovered. This performance may be below that of normal operation if the service is not able to recover completely, even after the faulty component has been repaired. Stage F represents throughput delivered while the server is reset by the operator, whereas stage G represents the transient throughput immediately after reset. For each stage, we need two parameters: (i) the length of time that the system will remain in that stage, and (ii) the average throughput delivered during that stage. These parameters are either measured in phase 1 or an assumed environmental value that must be supplied by the evaluators. Sometimes stages may not be present or may be cut short. For example, if there are no warming effects, then stages B, D, and G would not exist. In practice, we set the length of time the system is in such a state to zero.
Modeling Overall Availability and Performance. To combine the effects of a particular fault load, we assume that faults are not correlated, fault arrivals are exponentially distributed, and faults queue at the system so that only a single fault is in effect at any point in time. (We address some of these assumptions and the potential errors they may introduce in [26] .) These assumptions allow us to add together the various fractions of time spent in degraded modes.
In particular, if Tn is the server throughput under normal operation, c the faulty component, T 
Performability Metric
We propose a combined performability metric that allows direct comparison of systems using both performance and availability as input criteria. Our approach is to multiply the average throughput by an availability factor as follows: P = Tn×
, where Tn is the throughput under normal operation, AI is an ideal availability (e.g., 0.99999), AA is the average availability, and P is the performability of the system. This metric is an intuitive measure for performability because it scales linearly with both performance and unavailability. Obviously, if performance doubles, our performability metric doubles. On the other hand, if the unavailability decreases by a factor of 2, then performability also roughly doubles. (The intuition behind this relationship between unavailability (u) and performability is that we can approximate log(1 − u) as −u when u is small.)
The PRESS Server
PRESS is a highly optimized yet portable cluster-based locality-conscious web server that has been shown to provide good performance in a wide range of scenarios [9, 10] . Like other locality-conscious servers [1, 4, 27] , PRESS is based on the observation that serving a request from any memory cache, even a remote cache, is substantially more efficient than serving it from disk, even a local disk.
In PRESS, any node of the cluster can receive a client request and becomes the initial node for that request. When the request arrives at the initial node, the request is parsed and, based on its content, the node must decide whether to service the request itself or forward the request to another node, the service node. The service node retrieves the file from its cache (or disk) and returns it to the initial node. Upon receiving the file from the service node, the initial node sends it to the client.
To intelligently distribute the HTTP requests it receives, each node needs locality and load information about all the other nodes. Locality information takes the form of the names of the files that are currently cached, whereas load information is represented by the number of open connections handled by each node. To disseminate caching information, each node broadcasts its action to all other nodes whenever it replaces or starts caching a file. To disseminate load information, each node piggy-backs its current load onto any intra-cluster message. 1 It is interesting that the denominator of Wc is just MT T Fc instead of MT T Fc + MT T Rc. We refer the reader to [26] for a discussion of why this is correct.
Communication architecture. PRESS is comprised of one main coordinating thread and a number of helper threads used to ensure that the main thread never blocks. The helper threads include a set of disk threads used to access files on disk and a pair of send/receive threads for intra-cluster communication.
PRESS can use either TCP or VIA for intra-cluster communication. The TCP version basically has the same structure of its VIA counterpart; the main differences are the replacement of the VI end-points by TCP sockets and the elimination of flow control messages, which are implemented transparently to the server by TCP itself.
Reconfiguration. PRESS is often used (as in our experiments) without a front-end device, relying on round-robin DNS for initial request distribution to nodes. Some versions of PRESS have been designed to tolerate node (and application process) crashes, removing the faulty node from the cooperating cluster when the fault is detected and re-integrating the node when it recovers. Fault detection when VIA is used for intra-cluster communication is simple. A node assumes that another node has failed if the VIA connection between them is broken.
When TCP is the communication substrate, in addition to detecting failures from broken connections, PRESS can also employ periodic heartbeat messages. To avoid sending too many messages, we organize the cluster nodes in a directed ring structure. A node only sends heartbeats to the node it points to. If a node does not receive three consecutive heartbeats from its predecessor, it assumes that the predecessor has failed. (When using VIA, the nodes are also organized into a directed ring, but only for recovery purposes.)
In both cases, temporary recovery is implemented by simply excluding the failed node from the server. Multiple node faults can occur simultaneously. Every time a fault occurs, the ring structure is modified to reflect the new configuration.
The second and final step in recovery is to re-integrate a recovered node into the cluster. When using TCP, the rejoining node broadcasts its IP address to all other nodes. The currently active node with lowest node identifier (ID) responds by informing the rejoining node about the current cluster configuration and its ID. With that information, the rejoining node can reestablish the intracluster connections with the other nodes. After each connection is reestablished, the rejoining node is sent the caching information of the respective node. When the intra-cluster communication is done with VIA, the rejoining node simply tries to reestablish its connection with all other nodes. As connections are reestablished, the rejoining node is sent the caching information of the respective nodes.
Versions. Several versions of PRESS have been developed in order to study the performance impact of different communication mechanisms [10] . Table 1 lists the versions of PRESS that we consider in this paper. For each version, we summarize its main characteristics, their expected impact on performance and availability, and their near-peak throughputs on our 4 cluster nodes. The throughputs of the various versions of PRESS will be compared against throughput when various faults are injected into the cluster.
All PRESS versions cooperate in caching files, but differ in terms of their approach to detecting failed nodes, and the per- formance of their intra-cluster messaging. TCP-PRESS and the VIA-PRESS versions use connection breaks to detect node failures, whereas TCP-PRESS-HB uses heartbeat messages. PRESS uses intra-cluster messages for request forwarding, dissemination of caching information, and transfer of file data. When using VIA for intra-cluster communication, flow-control messages are also used. In TCP-PRESS and TCP-PRESS-HB, all message types involve data copies on both sides and interrupt-driven message reception. VIA-PRESS-0 also utilizes regular messages, but they are sent directly from user-space. To avoid the overhead of receiver interrupts, VIA-PRESS-3 and VIA-PRESS-5 utilize remote memory writes and polling in all messages. Remote writes are implemented by allocating buffers at each node for each other node. Polling is done by looking at message sequence numbers stored at the last position of each (fixed-size) buffer entry. Processors poll for messages at the end of the main server loop. VIA-PRESS-5 improves performance further by avoiding the large copies involved in file data transfers. The copy at the receiver is eliminated by sending the data to the client right out of the communication buffer. The copy at the sender is eliminated by transferring the data directly from the sender's file cache. For that, all the pages corresponding to cached files must be pinned in physical memory.
Fault Injection and Fault Model
We use Mendosus [23] , a cluster-based fault injection and network emulation infrastructure, to study the behavior of PRESS in the presence of faults. Mendosus is implemented completely in software, via a set of kernel modules and user-level libraries. The service being studied runs live on top of Mendosus; faults are injected in real-time in order to measure the service's live response to faults.
Mendosus can inject a wide range of faults. The fault model that we consider for this study includes physical faults in the networking hardware, end-node crashes, resource exhaustion faults within the operating system, and application faults, focusing particularly on the large class of faults arising from inappropriate parameters passed to the communication interfaces. We chose to consider operating system resource exhaustion, in particular, memory exhaustion, in addition to the hardware faults because previous studies have shown that memory exhaustion may be a dominant factor in the "aging" of operating systems [12, 36] . Likewise, we chose the specific application-level faults because a previous study suggests that they are the dominant categories of application errors [11] . We could have assumed a completely generic application fault model, such as the crashing of a process. However, this would not have brought out the different ways that these errors propagate through the different communication layers. Table 2 lists the specific faults that we consider.
Network Hardware and Node Faults
We consider fail-stop faults in links and switches, components that typically comprise the intra-cluster network of today's server cluster. (In this study, NIC faults are considered a source of node faults and are accounted for in node crashes and hangs.) We only consider fail-stop faults as we are more concerned with application-level effects, rather than channel errors that are typically dealt with in the communication substrate or protocol.
Mendosus can inject three types of node faults: hard reboot, soft reboot, and node freeze. All can be either transient or permanent, depending on the specified fault behavior. The node crash fault type we study here corresponds to the hard reboot fault. A detailed description of how Mendosus implements network and nodes faults is found in [26] .
Resource Exhaustion Faults
Transient situations on a server node running many processes can at times create a shortage of resources (e.g., memory, disk space, file descriptors, etc.). This can happen when a buggy process asks for too much resource or a bug in the kernel leads to leakage. In this study, as already mentioned, we only consider exhaustion of memory.
We implemented two types of memory faults. First, failure to allocate skbufs within the kernel for a specified duration of time. This simulates situations when the kernel can no longer allocate more kernel memory. We implemented this by trapping the calls to skbuf allocations for intra-cluster communication and returning an error to the caller.
The second fault involves running out of memory on a pindown request. This again simulates situations such as a buggy (or just greedy) process pinning an unusual amount of memory, causing shortage of pinnable physical pages for other processes. Kernels usually limit the number of pinnable pages to only a fraction of the available physical pages (e.g., the Linux 2.2x kernels limit this amount to half the number of physical pages) to maintain a safe buffer for possible future allocations. To implement this fault, we had to modify the cLAN driver since the driver directly manipulates the page table when a client registers some memory with it. In particular, we modified the cLAN driver to dynamically adjust the threshold above which requests to lock memory were returned with error status.
Application Faults
We implement two classes of application faults. First, generic errors that we do not model in detail lead to either a process crash or process hang. These faults are effected by a user-level daemon running on each node. For our study of PRESS, the server process on each node is started by the daemon. An application hang fault is injected by having the daemon send a SIGSTOP to the server process. The process can be restarted if the fault is transient by sending a SIGCONT to it. A crash is injected by killing the application process.
The next class of faults models actual application level bugs. Again, we thought that studying actual application bugs would be more enlightening than just using the above coarse-grain faults because it would give us insight into the propagation of such errors through the different communication subsystems.
The class of "real" errors involve bad parameters passed to calls into the communication subsystem. We implement the injection of these faults by interposing a software layer between the application and the normal communication library. Our layer traps specific calls, modifies one or more parameters, and then passes the call to the communication library.
Specifically, we injected faults into the send() and recv() calls for socket-based communication, and the VipPostSend() and VipPostRecv() calls to the cLAN VIPL library. For the VIA calls, the parameters were actually inside VIA descriptors, and so we modified the corresponding fields within a descriptor before passing it up to VIPL library. We considered three types of corrupted parameters: passing of NULL pointers, off-by-N for data pointers, and off-by-N for buffer sizes. N in all cases were in the range of 0 to 100 bytes, which was observed in [34] to be the dominant range for offset errors.
PRESS Behavior Under Single-Fault Loads
We now apply the first phase of our methodology to evaluate the performability of PRESS. In particular, we measure and explain the behavior of all 5 versions of PRESS under single faults injected in isolation.
Experimental Setup
In all experiments, we run a four-node version of PRESS on four 800 MHz PIII PCs, each of which is equipped with 206 MByes of memory and 2 10,000 rpm SCSI disks. Nodes are interconnected by a 1 Gb/s cLAN network. We can communicate with TCP or VIA over this network. PRESS was allocated 128 MBytes on each node for its file cache; the remainder of the memory was sufficient for the operating system and the server code so that there were no page faults during the experiments.
The workload for all experiments is generated by a set of clients running on separate machines. To stress the communication aspect of PRESS, our experiments only involve static content and the entire set of documents is replicated at each node. The client machines are connected to PRESS by the same cLAN network that connects the nodes of the cluster. Using a single network for communication is not at all a problem. The total network traffic does not saturate any of the cLAN network interfaces, links, or the switch, and so the interference between the two classes of traffic is minimal in our setup. Furthermore, our fault-injection infrastructure allows us to differentiate between intra-cluster communication and client-server communication when injecting networkrelated faults. Thus, the clients are never disturbed by faults injected into the intra-cluster communication.
Each client generates load by following a trace gathered at Rutgers; we chose this trace from several previously used to evaluate the performance of PRESS, because it has the largest working set [9] . We modified the file set so that all files have the same size (the average size of the original file set). This modification was necessary to ensure that PRESS delivers a stable throughput throughout the trace.
To achieve a particular load on the server, each client generates a stream of requests according to a Poisson process with a given average arrival rate. Each request is set to time out after 2 seconds if the connection cannot be completed, and to time out after 6 seconds if, after successful connection, the request cannot be completed.
Network Hardware Failures
In this section, we study the behavior of PRESS for faults in the intra-cluster communication hardware. First we discuss the effects of the faults on each version, and then draw some conclusions on the differing behavior. Because of space constraints, we will only show results for a subset of the faults injected; the reader can find all our data at our web-site [37] . Figure 2 shows the effects of a single transient link failure. We do not show the graphs for VIA-PRESS-0 and VIA-PRESS-3 because they are essentially the same as that of VIA-PRESS-5. TCP-PRESS exhibits its expected behavior under link failure, by stalling for the period of the fault. The TCP protocol on the cooperating nodes keeps trying to re-send packets across the faulty component, causing the filling up of communication queues on all nodes, thus dropping the throughput to zero until slightly after the component recovers and the messages start flowing again. Note that the fault does not last long enough for TCP to close the connection. These timeouts tend to be very long, on order of 10-15 minutes.
In contrast, TCP-PRESS-HB detects the fault in a very short time and reconfigures. The reason is that the heartbeat messages lost over the faulty link cause the other nodes to assume that the unreachable node is down. This splinters the cluster into 3 cooperating nodes and 1 independent node. The detection and recovery durations correspond to a failure detection threshold of 15 seconds (3 heartbeats) used by the heartbeat code.
Similar to TCP-PRESS-HB, the VIA versions detect the failure almost instantaneously because the connections to the unreachable node all break. VIA versions splinter into 3 cooperating nodes and 1 independent node just as TCP-PRESS-HB. Interestingly, TCP-PRESS-HB and the VIA versions do not reconfigure back into a single cluster once the link returns to normal operation. This surprising behavior arises from a mismatch between the fault model assumed by PRESS and the actual fault. PRESS assumes that nodes fail but links and switches do not. Thus, reconfiguration only occurs at startup and on loss of 3 heartbeats; nodes do not merge again after partitions. Return to normal operation thus requires the intervention of an administrator to restart all but one of the sub-clusters. This, in effect, makes these versions less available than the basic TCP-PRESS in the face of relatively short transient faults. Figure 3 shows the effects of a hard reboot fault, i.e., a node crash. Again, we do not show the graphs for VIA-PRESS-0 and VIA-PRESS-3 because they are similar to that of VIA-PRESS-5.
Node Faults
Because it is not capable of immediately detecting node failures, TCP-PRESS grinds to a halt while the faulty node is down; all communication queues get filled up with messages for the crashed node. When the crashed node comes back up, an interesting timing problem develops. The recovered node tries to rejoin the cluster, as Mendosus starts another PRESS process automatically, but is not able to. The reason is that the other nodes do not detect the reboot until a little while later. During this period, all the rejoin messages sent by the recovered node are disregarded by the rest of the cluster. After the recovered node gives up trying to rejoin, the other 3 nodes detect the termination of the connections and form a group of cooperating servers.
TCP-PRESS-HB and the VIA versions behave exactly as expected and almost identically. In TCP-PRESS-HB the node crash is detected by the heatbeat protocol, whereas in the VIA versions the connections to the faulty node break. After detection, the 3 remaining nodes continue cooperation. After the node reboots and Mendosus restarts the PRESS process, the node is able to rejoin the cluster and throughput returns to the normal level.
Results for node hangs are similar except that TCP-PRESS correctly deduce that no fault has occurred (although throughput does fall to zero while everyone waits for the hung node) while TCP-PRESS-HB incorrectly decides that a fault has occurred and splinters into two sub-clusters.
Memory Exhaustion Faults
In this section we consider the effects of communicationrelated resource exhaustion, in particular, the memory system. Figure 4 shows the effect of kernel memory exhaustion, which 
Figure 4. Throughput of TCP-PRESS and TCP-PRESS-HB when a kernel memory exhaustion failure is injected and throughput of VIA-PRESS-5 when a pinnable memory exhaustion failure is injected.
causes failures in the allocation of communication buffers. The throughput of TCP-PRESS drops to zero during the fault, since the stalling of communication to the faulty node freezes the entire cluster. The TCP packets arriving at the faulty node are dropped, whereas packets leaving the node get queued up within the operating system, waiting for buffer allocations. In contrast, TCP-PRESS-HB splinters into 3 cooperating nodes and a singleton after 3 heartbeats from the faulty node are not received. The VIA versions perform pre-allocation of most network resources during service initiation. This makes them less vulnerable to dynamic fluctuations in memory resources. Since they did not show any degradation in performance during the fault period, we do not present their graphs here.
VIA-PRESS-5 is succeptible to pinnable memory exhaustion faults, however. The zero-copy messaging in this version requires memory to be registered with the VIA library, which in turn pins the registered region. Cache replacements cause memory to be unpinned (file that is being replaced) and later pinned (file that is entering the cache). When a node in VIA-PRESS-5 is unable to pin memory, it drops files from its cache to free up memory. The cache misses arising from these dropped files degrade the throughput during the fault period, as also shown in Figure 4 . Figure 5 shows the behavior of PRESS when a null value is passed as the data pointer to the send API. The TCP versions detect this fault synchronously and return an EFAULT error code to the invoker. The VIA versions diagnose the error code as a fatal error, and terminate themselves. The recovery, achieved by restarting the application, reintegrates the faulty server into the cluster. In VIA-PRESS-0 the asynchronous error reporting through error status in completed descriptors achieves the same effect as the TCP versions. However, in the remote memory write-intensive VIA-PRESS-3 and VIA-PRESS-5, the error is reported on both nodes involved in the remote operation. This causes the termination of 2 nodes as per PRESS's fail-fast approach. However, the restart of the PRESS processes returns the performance from an extremely degraded state to a normal throughput.
Application Faults
We also considered off-by-N values for data pointer and the data size parameters. In these experiments, we observe that either, only the sender or only the receiver node experience an error as a result of these incorrect parameters. In contrast, the fault is reported at both ends of the communication in the remote memory write versions. In fact, remote memory writes poses a greater risk as "valid" bad parameters result in corruption of data (and possibly meta-data) on the remote node as well. In our current study though, we have not quantified this additional risk. We believe that this demands a deeper statistical study that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Performability of the PRESS Versions
We now proceed to the second phase of our methodology to evaluate the performability of the different PRESS versions. We first examine performability assuming the same fault load for all versions of PRESS. Then, we also consider what happens if we assume that the VIA versions of PRESS experience more stressful fault loads; there are two reasons why it is interesting to consider this case: (1) systems such as VIA are still relatively immature, possibly leading to a higher fault rate because of hardware and/or firmware bugs. Table 3 gives the initial fault load used to compare the performability of the different versions of PRESS. Recall that to make the modeling tractable, we assume that faults in different components are not correlated and all fault arrivals are exponentially distributed. We have done our best to derive meaningful parameters from the available data [11, 12, 15, 21, 35, 34, 36] . However, data is sparse, particularly for application-level errors. Thus, we examine performability for a range, once per day to once per month, of MTTFs for application level faults. In addition, because we have multiple classes of errors, we divided the application fault rate between these errors according to the distribution observed in [11] . This led to approximately the following ratio: process crash 40%, process hang 40%, null pointer 8%, off by N data pointer 9%, off by N size 2%. The 3 minute MTTR for each of the application errors, considers the time required to restart the application in a clean state -which may involve rebooting the node. Figure 6 shows (a) the modeled unavailability and (b) performability of the different versions of PRESS when scaling the application fault rate from once per day to once per month. Figure 6(a) also shows the contribution of each fault type to overall unavailability. Overall, perhaps surprisingly, the availability of all three VIA versions is slightly better than that of the two TCP versions. While non-intuitive, this result arises because the VIA fault reporting is more accurate for the cluster environment. The two TCP versions only use end-to-end information to try and detect failures and can be led astray. On the one hand, TCP-PRESS takes too long to detect a number of the faults because it assumes that lost packets are due to transient congestion, not component faults. TCP-PRESS-HB, on the other hand, sometimes concludes too quickly that lost heartbeat messages translate to faults, rather than delay because of other reasons.
Fault

MTTF MTTR
Link down 6 months 3 minutes Switch down 1 year 1 hour Node crash 2 weeks 3 minutes Node freeze 2 weeks 3 minutes Memory pinning failure 61 days 3 minutes Memory allocation failure 61 days 3 minutes Process crash var. 3 minutes Process hang var. 3 minutes Bad parameters -null pointer var. 3 minutes Bad parameters -off-by-N data pointer var. 3 minutes Bad parameters -off-by-N size var. 3 minutes
Fault Load
Performability Under the Same Fault Load
Of course, the above discussion does not mean that heartbeats are useless. The reason that heartbeats were less useful than one might expect is that PRESS does not reconfigure when faults do not lead to one or more process crashes. To make heartbeats more effective, one needs to implement a rigorous membership algorithm that can repair the group membership correctly when loss of heartbeats leads to the incorrect splintering of the cluster.
At low application fault rates, a second reason why the VIA versions exhibit better availability than the TCP versions is that they are not vulnerable to operating system resource exhaustion errors. Since they preallocate resources at startup time, the VIA versions continue to operate well even when the operating system runs out of memory.
We also observe that there is little difference in the availability of the VIA versions. This is perhaps not unexpected because, for the vast majority of application errors, the effect of the fault is the same: the hanging or crashing of an process. This is also true of the node faults. It is interesting to note, however, that there are noticeable differences in the contribution to unavailability of the different specific application fault types at high application fault rates. The reason is that these faults lead to a few differences in the behavior of the different versions. At lower application fault rates, careful analysis shows that VIA-PRESS-5 gives the worst availability because the dynamic pinning of memory makes it slightly vulnerable to resource exhaustion faults. However, since the VIA versions manage their own communication resources, VIA-PRESS-5 is able to adapt to the resource exhaustion faults better than the TCP versions; in particular, it releases some of the memory that it had previously pinned to free up the needed resources. These observations lead us to surmise that different dependency on user-level communication mechanisms would likely lead to different availability if only we could more accurately emulate real application and operating system faults, allowing them to propagate through the communication subsystem.
Finally, while the above differences are interesting, perhaps the most significant conclusion is that availability is uniformly terrible. With an application fault rate of once per day, availability is only in the 99% range, and of course, the effect of application crashes dominate. Even at a fault rate of once per month, avail- ability does not reach 99.9%. Since the differences in availability are relatively small, the performability graphs show the expected results: the highest performing version of PRESS leads to the best performability.
Pessimistic Fault Loads for VIA Versions
Transient Packet Drops We now examine a number of scenarios with a more pessimistic fault load for the VIA versions than the TCP versions. The purpose of these sensitivity experiments is to show our methodology can aid designers in reasoning about the fault-rates where various performance vs. availability trade-offs make sense or are illadvised. For example, using our method an architect could quantify at what fault rates switching from TCP to VIA is justified even though it may introduce bugs, and thus increase the observed fault rate.
We first look at transient packet loss. While the VIA specification states that transient packet loss should be extremely rare, in practice, it may occur more often because of hardware and/or software bugs [38] . Thus, we model transient packet loss as application process crashes, assuming that the packet loss would be reported as an error, leading to the process terminating itself. On the other hand, since much of TCP's robustness comes from tolerating transient packet drops, we assume that such faults have no effect on the TCP versions of PRESS. Figure 7 compares the performability of the different versions as the transient packet loss rate is varied from 1 per day to 1 per month. These faults are in addition to the fault rates in Table 3 .
Observe that the performability of the TCP versions are roughly comparable to those of the VIA versions when the packet loss rate is about 1 per week; TCP wins if the packet loss rate is greater than 1 per week and loses if the rate is less than 1 per week. These results imply that if the designer believes that the LAN/SAN is relatively immature, then it is perhaps better to use TCP and sacrifice some performance. On the other hand, if the LAN/SAN is relatively mature technology with little reason to suspect a high rate of packet loss, then it is worthwhile to bypass the software overhead of TCP.
We next consider a scenario where a server using VIA contains more bugs due to VIA's more complex and unfamiliar programming model. Figure 8 compares the performability of the different PRESS versions as the VIA versions are subjected to increasing rates of application faults. These results show that the performability is comparable when the additional application fault load on the VIA versions is around 1 per week. Again, the implication is that if a designer is confident that his programming team can deal well with the additional complexity of programming directly on VIA, leading to little additional software bugs, then choosing VIA would give the best performance and performability. On the other hand, if the implementation team is inexperienced or just does not have enough time, using TCP might be the best option.
Finally, we consider what happens when there are occasional system crashes in the VIA networking subsystem due to hardware or firmware bugs 2 . This is a plausible scenario, because leading edge technologies, such as VIA, are often less mature, and so more likely contain bugs, than standard technologies with large user bases. We model these system bugs as switch crashes. Figure 9 shows the impact of adding on failures due to system bugs. The tradeoffs here are similar to the previous variations. Figure 10 compares the performability of the different versions of PRESS assuming a combination of added faults for the VIA versions: a packet drop rate of 1 per month, added application fault rate of 1 per every 2 weeks, and system failure of 1 per month. Observe that under this fault load, the performability of two of the three VIA versions are below that of the TCP-HB version. Thus, we conclude that the performance advantage of a user-level network such as VIA really depends on how mature the product is and whether the programmer can use the exported API without introducing additional software bugs.
Discussion
In the course of our study, we uncovered a number of important performance vs. reliability tradeoffs in communication stacks of high availability systems. In this section, we discuss some of these lessons and speculate on the features a communication layer oriented toward both high performance and high availability systems should have.
A transport stack must match the underlying fault model with the class of faults that occur in the network fabric. Our results show that a mismatch between the stack and fabric fault models has a tremendous impact on overall system availability. When running over fabrics that drop packets in the face of queue overruns, and in environments with otherwise uncontrolled bandwidth usage, TCP-style timeout and retry is appropriate. On the other hand, when running over SAN-style networks with hop-by-hop flow control, where packet loss signals more serious problems than transient congestion, a VIA fail-stop model is appropriate. Future protocol stacks may be able to determine which fault-model to use dynamically, but in the near future designers should pick a transport layer that best maps to the fabric's actual fault characteristics.
We also found it useful for each component in the communication path to report errors immediately and all the way to endpoints. In the cluster context, LANs that discard bad packets are undesirable because they inhibit early fault detection. Some SANs do forward bad packets to the final endpoint [5, 17] , but this information is often not used by the transport protocols to initiate error recovery. Turning to congestion, using packet drops to signal congestion, while increasing network throughput, is a very slow method of fault detection. In a LAN that drops packets, schemes that actively signal congestion [29] may result in higher availability.
We found that copying can be a critical fault-containment point for communication layers. While our rates of corrupted packets due to overruns was low, we also note that we could not detect overruns for VIA-PRESS-3 and VIA-PRESS-5.
Our last lesson concerns the pre-allocation of memory resources. In general, if there are enough resources these should be pre-allocated during channel set-up. While this increases overall memory usage, such a pre-allocation strategy gives the designer more flexibility in recovering from periods of memory stress.
Finally, we observe that in order to better compare systems, much more empirical measurement of actual MTTR and MTTF of real systems is needed. While we did base many of our modeled MTTFs and MTTRs on measured systems, data were quite sparse and it was unclear how general they were.
Related Work
There has been much work on examining the robustness of communication protocols, mostly in the context of packet loss. A seminal work on the subject [30] makes the argument that only the endpoints have enough semantic information to handle faults. However, the work does not discuss the appropriate error recovery mechanisms needed upon a fault, nor does it address how intermediate nodes of the system should report faulty conditions to the endpoints. Indeed, our experience hints that a conclusion often drawn from this work-that intermediate nodes should do very little error detection and recovery-is mistaken. Intermediate nodes should rather provide fast, accurate error reporting to endpoints.
There is an enormous volume of work on TCP's tolerating of transient packet loss and probing the network for bandwidth (e.g., [6, 16, 19] ). All these works, however, assume that packet loss is due to congestion, where retransmission has a likely probability of success. Two areas where the fault model implicit in TCP breaks down are in the wireless networks and System Area Networks (SANs). In wireless networking, packet loss often implies channel degradation, so the recovery actions for TCP should be retransmit quickly [3] . In the SAN context, researchers argued that faults signal catastrophic failure [5, 31, 39] , requiring human intervention. However, they also argue the fault rates of these networks are very low.
The LAN and WAN networking communities have recognized that byte stream abstraction is not always appropriate and so have proposed many alternative messaging based protocols, e.g., [28, 33] . The key difference from the MPP and SAN networks is that like TCP, these protocols viewed packet loss as signaling congestion.
There has been extensive work in analysing faults and how they impact systems [13, 22, 34] . However, the focus of these studies was not on the communication system. Studies benchmarking system behavior under fault loads include [20, 24] . However, these works do not provide a good understanding of how one would estimate overall system availability under a given fault load. System availability studies such as [2, 25] are works in this direction. An interesting paper is [8] , which outlines a methodology for benchmarking systems' availability. Our work here focuses more closely on cluster-based servers, and in particular the impact of faults affecting the communication system on service performability.
Conclusions
We have studied the impact of TCP and VIA on the availability and performance of cluster-based servers using a combination of fault-injection and analytic modeling. Surprisingly, the results show that, under our estimated fault load, a VIA-based server delivered better availability than a TCP-based server. We found the single most important factor to be how well the internal fault model of the communication substrate matches the actual faults. In a SAN context, the transient fault model used by TCP reduced overall performability, because of the lengthy time for TCP to report failures. VIA, with its fail-stop model, was much more appropriate for many faults because it allowed higher-level recovery to be initiated quickly. We also found that the use of a heartbeat protocol can mitigate the impact of TCP's inaccurate faultmodel; however, the heartbeat protocol must be accompanied by a robust membership protocol since the heartbeat protocol can be led astray by lengthy communication delays. Finally, we found the pre-allocation of memory made VIA immune to resource allocation failures, whereas the implementation of TCP required dynamic memory resources.
We have also considered the case in which VIA-based systems may experience more stressful fault loads because the underlying technology is less mature and the programming model more complex. By varying the fault rates, we were able to quantify the cross-over point at which it may be advisable to use a more tested protocol such as TCP. We found that faults in a VIA-based server, such as switch, link, and application errors, would have to occur at approximately 4 times the rate of a TCP-based system for the performability of VIA and TCP systems to be equal.
We speculated how a communication layer which addressed availability and performance might be structured. We argue that it should use messaging (not a byte stream), single-copy transfers, pre-allocated channel resources, and match the network fabric's fault model.
Finally, in spite of the significant fault detection and recovery actions taken by both TCP and VIA, we expect overall system availability to remain between 99% and 99.8%, implying clusterbased systems will be unavailable for several days a year. There is much work to be done to make these systems utterly transparent to everyday users.
